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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case.
This case arises from a Petition for Accounting and Performance of Trustee Duties

("Petition for Accounting") filed by the Appellant, Michael D. Ferguson (''Michael"), in
Madison County, against his siblings Lois (Ferguson) Webb ("Lois"), Wade Ferguson ("Wade")
and J. Xarissa Koenig ("Rissa"), in their capacities as successor co-trustees of a group of trusts
established by their parents and as co-personal representatives of the estate of their mother, Sybil
Ferguson ("Sybil"), and against Steven J. Hart ("Steve"), in his capacity as a successor co-trustee
of the trusts. (See R. pp. 10-21) The issues in the case revolve around (1) the enforceability of
a forfeiture clause in the agreement governing the trusts and (2) the scope of information that
may be demanded from successor trustees by a member of an indefinite class who has been
designated to receive a portion of trust assets remaining in a trust after the deaths of the grantors,
by virtue of the exercise of a discretionary testamentary general power of appointment by the last
grantor to die.

II.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings Below.
Roger Ferguson ("Roger") and his wife, Sybil, established a revocable living trust on

May 23, 1994 (the "Original Trust"), and transferred many of their assets into the name of the
trust while they were both alive. (R. p. 514

,r 3).

They served as co-trustees of the Original

Trust until Roger's death on April 7, 2012. (R. p. 677 L. 19). By agreement dated October 14,
2011 (the "Amended and Restated Trust Agreement"), Roger and Sybil amended and restated the
agreement governing the Original Trust. (R. p. 514 ,r 3 LL. 8-9).
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Under Article Two of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement, Roger and Sybil
"specifically and intentionally disinherited and made no provision" for two of their children,
Michael and Debbie F. Preece, and one grandchild, Andrew Preece. (R. p. 76). Article Two
designated those three individuals as "Omitted Persons" and instructed that they be deemed to
have predeceased both Roger and Sybil for purposes of the Amended and Restated Trust
Agreement. (R. p. 76).
While both Roger and Sybil were alive, the Original Trust was known as the Ferguson
Family Revocable Trust dated May 23, 1994, as amended and restated, and Roger and Sybil
served as trustees.

(R. p. 514 1 3).

Article Seven of the Amended and Restated Trust

Agreement provided that the trust estate of the Original Trust be divided into sub-trusts upon the
death of the first grantor to die (R. pp. 86-88), and Section 3.03 gave the surviving grantor the
right to continue to serve as trustee "of all trusts created under this Trust Agreement." (R. p. 77
Trust §3.03(a)). Section 3.03 also designated three of the children of Roger and Sybil--Lois,
Wade, and Rissa--and Steve--the long-time accountant for and friend to Roger and Sybil--to
serve jointly as successor co-trustees when the surviving grantor died or was no longer able or
willing to serve as trustee. (R. p. 77 Trust§ 3.03(a)).
Roger died on April 7, 2012, while Sybil was still alive. (R. p. 5141 4). After Roger's
death, the assets remaining in the Original Trust were divided among three sub-trusts known as
The Roger Ferguson Family Trµst (the "Family Trust"), The Roger Ferguson Nonexempt Marital
Trust (the "Nonexempt Marital Trust") and the Sybil Ferguson Survivor's Trust (the "Survivor's
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Trust"

1

and collectively with the Family Trust and the Nonexempt Marital Trust, the

"Sub-Trusts"). 2 (R. p. 514

,r 5).

Sybil exercised her right under Section 3 .03 and continued to

serve as the sole trustee of all three Sub-Trusts until her death on May 23, 2015. (R. pp. 514-15

,r 6).
Article Eight of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement contains prov1S1ons
governing the administration of the Survivor's Trust. Section 8.01 of Article Eight provided
that all net income of the Survivor's Trust was to be distributed to the surviving grantor. (R. p.

88).

Section 8.02 gave the trustee the right to distribute as much of the principal of the

Survivor's Trust to the surviving grantor as the trustee "may determine is necessary or advisable
for any purpose" and as much of the principal of the Survivor's Trust as the surviving grantor
may request "for any reason." (R. p. 88). In other words, Sybil, as trustee, had the right to
distribute to herself as beneficiary any portion, and as much as she wanted, of the trust estate of
the Survivor's Trust. She had the right to distribute all of the assets if she wanted. Section 8.05
of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement also reserved to Sybil, as the surviving grantor,
1

The District Court's Decision on Appeal sometimes referred to the Survivor's Trust as the
"Shelter Trust." "Shelter Trust" is a term that estate planners sometimes use to refer to a trust
that is established upon the death of a first spouse to die to hold assets subject to certain
restrictions that will prevent the assets from being included in the taxable estate of the surviving
spouse, while still preserving the assets for the support of the surviving spouse if needed. In this
case, the Family Trust served that purpose. For the sake of clarity and consistency, this brief
will not use the term "Shelter Trust."
2

1

The Amended and Restated Trust Agreement has provisions that could have resulted, under
certain conditions, in the creation and funding of more than three sub-trusts upon the death of the
first grantor to die. However, because the conditions that would have lead to the creation of
more than three sub-trusts did not exist at Roger's death, only three sub-trusts were created and
funded.
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the power to appoint all or any portion of the principal and undistributed net income remaining in
the Survivor's Trust at her death among any one or more persons or entiti,es, as she wished. (R.
p. 88). Pursuant to § 18.08 of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement, this discretionary
general power of appointment could be exercised in Sybil's will. (R. p. 104).
Article Eighteen of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement contains general
provisions governing administration of all trusts maintained under the Amended and Restated
Trust Agreement. (R. pp. 102-08). For example, § 18.01, which deals with distributions to
beneficiaries provides in pertinent part:
The Trustee is not required to inquire into the beneficiary's ultimate disposition of
the distributed property unless otherwise specifically directed by this Trust
Agreement. The Trustee may make distributions in cash or in kind, or partly in
each, in proportions and at values determined by the Trustee. The Trustee may
allocate undivided interests in specific assets to a beneficiary or trust created
hereunder in any proportion or manner the Trustee determines, even though the
property allocated to one beneficiary may be different from that allocated to
another beneficiary.
(R. p. 102). Section 18.05 provides:
No successor Trustee is obligated to examine the accounts, records, or actions of
any previous Trustee, the personal representative of the estate of a deceased
Grantor, or any other previous fiduciary. No successor Trustee shall be held
responsible for any act, omission, or forbearance by any previous Trustee or by
the personal representative of the estate of a deceased Grantor or any other
fiduciary .
(R. p. 103).
Section 20.03 of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement contains a "contest
provision," which reads as follows:
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If any beneficiary of this Trust or any trust created under this Trust Agreement,
alone or in conjunction with any other person or entity, engages in any of the
following actions, the right of the beneficiary to take any interest given to the
beneficiary under this Trust or any trust created under this Trust Agreement shall
be determined as it would have been determined as if the beneficiary predeceased
the last Grantor to die without leaving any surviving descendants: (a) contests by
a claim of undue influence, fraud, menace, duress, or lack of testamentary
capacity, or otherwise objects in any court to the validity of this Trust, any trust
created under the terms of this Trust Agreement, either Grantor's will, or any
beneficiary designation under any annuity, retirem~nt plan, IRA, Keogh, pension
or profit sharing plan, insurance policy or similar account or benefit signed by
either Grantor (hereinafter collectively referred to in this Section as "Documents"
or individually as a "Document"), or any amendments or codicils to any
Document; (b) seeks to obtain an adjudication in any court proceeding that a
Document or any of its provisions is void, or otherwise seeks to void, nullify, or
set aside a Document or any of its provisions; (c) files suit on a creditor's claim
filed by the beneficiary in a probate of the estate of either Grantor, against the
Trust estate or any Document, after rejection or lack of action by the applicable
fiduciary; (d) files a petition or other pleading to change the character
(community, separate, joint tenancy, partnership, domestic partnership, real or
personal, tangible or intangible) of property already so characterized by a
Document; (e) files a petition to impose a constructive trust or resulting trust on
any assets of the Trust estate; or (f) participates in any of the above actioris in a
manner adverse to the Trust estate, such as conspiring with or assisting any person
who takes any of the above actions. The Trustee may defend, at the expense of
the Trust estate, any such action and any violation of this Section. For purposes
of this Trust Agreement, a "contest" shall include, without limitation, any action
described above in an arbitration proceeding, but shall not include any action
described above solely in a mediation not preceded by the filing of a contest with
a court.
(emphasis added). (R. p. 115).
The Amended and Restated Trust Agreement names the surviving grantor as the sole
beneficiary of both the Nonexempt Marital Trust and the Family Trust during the surviving
grantor's lifetime. (R. p. 91 Trust§§ 10.01, 10.02, p. 93 Trust§ 11.02). Upon the death of the
surviving grantor, The Roger & Sybil Ferguson Charitable Foundation received the remaining
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assets of the Nonexempt Marital Trust (R. p. 92 Trust§ 10.05, pp. 94-99 Trust Art. 12-14), and
Lois, Wade, Rissa and most of Roger's and Sybil's grandchildren were designated to receive the
remaining assets of the Family Trust. (R. pp. 94-99 Trust§ 11.06 and Art. 12-13). Absent an
exercise of the surviving grantor's discretionary power to appoint the assets remaining in the
Survivor's Trust upon the surviving grantor's death, the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement
designated Lois, Wade, Rissa and certain of Roger's and Sybil's grandchildren to receive those
assets. (R. pp. 89-90 Trust§ 8.06, pp. 94-99 Trust Art. 12-13).
While Sybil was serving as sole trustee of the Sub-Trusts, she executed a new will dated
October 3, 2013, in which she directed that any assets remaining in the Survivor's Trust at her
death be distributed among a group of her descendants that included Michael, Lois, Wade, Rissa
and four grandchildren, pursuant to the testamentary power of appointment reserved to her in
Section 8.05 of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement.

(R. pp. 127-29). Nothing in

Sybil's will or any other document provided for Michael to receive anything from any of the
other Sub-Trusts.
Sybil died on May 23, 2015, domiciled in Maricopa County, Arizona. (R. p. 515, 8).
Following her death, Lois, Wade, Rissa and Steve became the successor co-trustees of the
Sub-Trusts, as provided in Section 3.03 (a) of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement.
Before Sybil's death, none of the Successor Trustees served as a trustee of the Original Trust or
any of the Sub-Trusts. (R. p. SJ 5 , 8).
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On August 31, 2015, Sybil's will was admitted to probate in Maricopa County, Arizona,
and Lois, Wade and Rissa were appointed as co-personal representatives (the "Co-Personal
Representatives") of Sybil's estate (the "Estate"). (R. p. 471).
Following Sybil's death, Michael requested from the Successor Trustees, both informally
and formally through his Petition for Accounting, financial information about the Original Trust
and all of the Sub-Trusts back to the date of Roger's death. (R. pp. 10-21 ). The Successor
Trustees provided Michael a significant amount of records and financial information about the
Survivor's Trust and its assets, both before and after the filing of Michael's Petition for
Accounting on July 27, 2016. (R. pp. 467-68

,r,r

11-12, p. 515

,r

10). Among other things,

Respondents provided Michael with bank statements, a copy of the estate tax return for Sybil's
estate, an inventory of the assets of the Survivor's Trust as of the date of Sybil's death, and an
interim accounting of the Survivor's Trust (R. pp. 467-68

,r

11, p. 515

,r

10).

All of the

information provided to Michael by the Successor Trustees was for the period from and after
Sybil's death. However, Michael was not satisfied with the information provided and filed a
Second Amended Petition for Accounting and Performance of Trustee Duties (the "Second
Amended Petition") demanding all financial records and an accounting dating back to the date of
Roger's death, including an accounting of the allocation of assets of the Original Trust among
the Sub-Trusts after Roger's death. (R. pp. 50-67).
The Successor Trustees, filed a Response to Second Amended Petition for Accounting
and Performance of Trustee Duties (the "Response to Second Amended Petition") on April 12,
2017, which included, among other things, nine affirmative defenses.
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(R. pp. 131-39).

In

summary those affirmative defenses assert that (1) the Idaho court lacks jurisdiction over Lois,
Wade and Rissa in their capacities as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate because Sybil
was domiciled in Arizona at the time of her death and a probate of the Estate is open in Arizona
and no probate or application for probate is pending in Idaho; (2) Michael lacks standing to seek
an accounting or any other relief with respect to the Original Trust, the Family Trust and the
Nonexempt Marital Trust because he is not, and never has been, a beneficiary of those trusts; (3)
Michael lacks standing to seek an accounting or any other relief with respect to the Survivor's
Trust for any period of time before Sybil's death because Michael was not a beneficiary of the
Survivor's Trust at any time before Sybil' s death; (4) Michael's requests for an accounting and
financial information related to the Survivor's Trust for the period from and after Sybil's death
are moot to the extent of the information that the Successor Trustee already have provided; (5) §
18.05 of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement provides a complete defense to any claim
that the Successor Trustees owe Michael any accounting for any period before the Successor
Trustees became trustee of any of the trusts; (6) § 18.03 of the Amended and Restated Trust
Agreement provides a defense to any request by Michael to subject any trust 'to the continuing
jurisdiction of the court; (7) Michael's claims are barred under the doctrine of waiver to the
extent they seek relief relating to periods of time before Sybil's death; (8) Michael's claims are
barred under the doctrine of estoppel to the extent they seek relief relating to periods of time
before Sybil's death; and (9) Michael's claims are barred under the doctrine of laches to the
extent they seek relief relating to periods of time before Sybil's death. (R. pp. 134-38).
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On March 16, 2017, during the pendency of this proceeding in the Magistrate Division of
the Seventh Judicial District in Madison County, Idaho, Michael submitted to the Co-Personal
Representatives a written claim against the Estate. (R. pp. 472-74 ). Michael's claim against
the Estate asserts that Michael is a creditor of the Estate because Sybil, in her capacity as trustee,
breached various fiduciary duties that she owed to Michael during her life.
22-29).

(R. p. 4 73 LL.

The Co-Personal Representatives disallowed Michael's claim against the Estate by

Notice ofDisallowance dated May 4, 2017. (R. p. 475). Following that disallowance, Michael
filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim in the Arizona probate court on May 30, 2017, seeking to
enforce his creditor's claim against the Estate. (R. pp. 476-78). By stipulation of the parties,
further proceedings in the Arizona probate on the Petition for Allowance of Claim were stayed
pending further action in the Idaho proceedings for accounting. 3 (R. p. 862 LL. 24-25).
Michael subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the Idaho
proceeding, seeking summary judgment in his favor on the first six of the Successor Trustees'
affirmative defenses.

(R. p. 200-02).

(Although, the Motion itself requested summary

judgment with respect to only the first five affirmative defenses, the parties briefed, and
Magistrate Eric Hunn ruled on, arguments related to all of the first six affirmative defenses.) On
September 20, 2017, after receiving leave from the Magistrate, the Successor Trustees filed a
3

The Magistrate's Memorandum Decision below creates the mistaken impression that the
Arizona proceeding was staye~ twice. The District Court's Decision on Appeal quoted the
portion of the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision that gives that mistaken impression. In
reality, only one stay has been issued in the Arizona proceeding, and that stay was ordered
pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Whether the Arizona proceeding was stayed once or twice
is immaterial to this appeal.
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Supplemental Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment ("Supplemental
Defense and Counterclaim"), asserting that Michael's actions in filing a creditor's claim and a
Petition for Allowance of Claim against Sybil's probate estate in Arizona triggered the forfeiture
provision in § 20.03 of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement and disqualified Michael
from receiving any benefits from the Survivor's Trust.

(R. pp. 425-31 ).

The Successor

Trustees then filed their own Motion for Summary Judgment requesting summary judgment in
their favor on their Supplemental Defense and Counterclaim or, in the alternative, summary
judgment in their favor on their first six affirmative defenses. (R. pp. 559-61).
On December 21, 2017, Magistrate Hunn issued a Memorandum Decision Regarding
Respondents and Petitioners Motions for Summary Judgment, containing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, in which he denied the Successor Trustees' request for summary judgment to
enforce the forfeiture provision in § 20.03 of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement, but
granted the Successor Trustees' request for summary judgment (and denied Michael's requests
for summary judgment) with respect to the Successor Trustees' first five affirmative defenses,
holding that the Successor Trustees were not obligated to provide information to Michael for any
period before Sybil's death. (R. pp 676-99). Among other things, the Magistrate held that
Michael was not a beneficiary of the Survivor's Trust before Sybil's death and that Sybil owed
Michael no fiduciary duty during her lifetime. 4 (R. pp. 692-94). Judgment was entered on

4

The Magistrate ruled that the court did not have jurisdiction over Lois, Wade and Rissa in their
capacities as Co-personal Representatives (First Affirmative Defense) (R. p.665), and Michael
did not appeal that portion of the Magistrate's ruling. The Magistrate also granted Michael (and
denied the Successor Trustees) summary judgment with respect to the Successor Trustees' sixth
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January 23, 2018, and the Judgment was certified by the Magistrate as a final judgment from
which an appeal may be taken. (R. pp. 700-03).
The Successor Trustees appealed to the District Court from the portion of the
Magistrate's decision denying their request to enforce the forfeiture provision against Michael.
(R. pp. 704-07). Michael cross-appealed from the portion of the Magistrate's decision denying
Michael's demand that the Successor Trustees provide an accounting and financial information
for periods before Sybil's death.

(R. pp. 708-14).

On December 29, 2018, Judge Gregory

Moeller issued a Decision on Appeal in which he reversed the Magistrate's decision to deny
summary judgment enforcing the forfeiture clause and upheld the Magistrate's determination
that Michael was not entitled to an accounting and financial records for the period of time before
Sybil's death.

(R. pp. 861-76).

Although Judge Moeller ruled that Michael became a

contingent beneficiary of the Survivor's Trust when Sybil signed her new will in 2013, which
contained language to exercise the discretionary testamentary general power of appointment in
favor of Michael and others, he held that Sybil, nevertheless owed no fiduciary duty to account
to Michael during her lifetime. (R. pp. 867-74). Accordingly, there was no reasonable basis
for Michael to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Sybil's estate. (R. pp. 871-72).
Michael now has appealed from the District Court' s determinations that he has no legal
right to compel the Successor Trustees to provide an accounting and financial records of the

affirmative defense (§ 18.03 provides a defense to any request to subject any trust to the
continuing jurisdiction of the court) because Michael has not requested that the court exercise
continuing jurisdiction over any trust. (R. p. 673) The Successor Trustees did not appeal that
portion of the Magistrate' s ruling.
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Survivor's Trust for periods before Sybil's death and that the forfeiture provision of§ 20.03 of
the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement is enforceable against him. (R. pp. 903-28).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Was the District Court correct in ruling that the forfeiture provision in the Amended and
Restated Trust Agreement is enforceable against Michael because, as a matter of law,
Michael has no right to maintain a breach of fiduciary duty action against Sybil's Estate?

B.

Was the District Court correct in ruling that neither Sybil nor the Successor Trustees
owed a duty to account to Michael concerning the administration of the Survivor's Trust
before Sybil's death?

C.

Are the Successor Trustees entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of
review is the same as the standard used by the court originally ruling on the motion.
Blankenship v. Washington Trust Bank, 153 Idaho 292,295, 281 P.3d 1070, 1073 (2012). "The

court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). In
this case, the parties agree that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court was correct in holding that the forfeiture clause in § 20.03 of the
Amended and Restated Trust Agreement is enforceable against Michael as a matter
of law.
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A.

Regardless of whether or not Michael became a "contingent beneficiary" of the
Survivor 's Trust when Sybil signed a new will in 2013 that contained language to
exercise her discretionary testamentary power of appointment in Michael's favor,
Michael forfeited any benefits he might have received from the Survivor's Trust rights
when he filed a breach offiduciary duty action against Sybil's Estate.
As an initial matter, this Court should determine whether the District Court was correct in

holding that Michael forfeited any benefits he may have ~eceived from the Survivor' s Trust by
filing a breach of fiduciary duty action against Sybil's Estate in Arizona.

If Michael has

forfeited all benefits he might have received from the Survivor' s Trust, he is no longer a
beneficiary and is not a real party in interest for purposes of Rule 17 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that "[a]n action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest." I.R.C.P. 17(a). "A real party in interest ' is the person who
will be entitled to the benefits of the action if successful, one who is actually and substantially
interested in the subject matter. "' Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho
866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1999) (quoting State Dep 't of Law Enforcement v. One 1990

Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct.App.1995) (quoting in turn Carrington v.
Crandall, 63 Idaho 651, 658, 124 P.2d 914, 917 (1942))). If Michael has forfeited all benefits
he might have received from the trust, he does not have an interest sufficient to be a real party in
interest.
\

1.

Michael 's filing of the Petition for Allowance of Claim in the Arizona probate
triggered the Forfeiture Provision in the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement.
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Section 20.03 of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement (the "Forfeiture Provision")
provides in pertinent part: "If any beneficiary of this Trust or any trust created under this Trust
Agreement, alone or in conjunction with any other person or entity, engages in any of the
following actions, the right of the beneficiary to take any interest given to the beneficiary under
this Trust or any trust created under this Trust Agreement shall be determined as it would have
been determined as if the beneficiary predeceased the last Grantor to die without leaving any
surviving descendants: . . . (c) files suit on a creditor's claim filed by the beneficiary in a probate
of the estate of either Grantor, against the Trust estate or any Document, after rejection or lack of
action by the applicable fiduciary . . .. The Trustee may defend, at the expense of the Trust
estate, any such action and any violation of this Section." (R. p. 115 LL. 13-34).
It is undisputed that Michael filed a creditor's claim in Sybil's probate Estate on March
16, 2017. That claim asserts that Sybil, acting in her capacity as trustee of the Survivor's Trust,
breached fiduciary duties owed to Michael under the Survivor's Trust during Sybil's lifetime.
The Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate disallowed Michael's claim by Notice of
Disallowance dated May 4, 2017. Michael then filed on May 30, 2017, a Petition for Allowance
of Claim in the probate court in Arizona, seeking to enforce his claim against the Estate.
Michael's action in filing the Petition for Allowance of Claim in Sybil's Estate, seeking
to enforce the asserted creditor's claim after it was disallowed by the Co-Personal
Representatives, is precisely th~ kind of action that Roger and Sybil sought to discourage when
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they included item (c) in the Forfeiture Provision. 5 Although they could not absolutely prevent
any of their family members from taking such action, they had every right to condition the
receipt of benefits from any of the trusts maintained under that agreement on a beneficiary not
taking such action.

The language of the Forfeiture Provision is clear- the right of any

beneficiary who engages in any of the specified actions "shall be determined as it would have
been determined as if the beneficiary predeceased the last Grantor to die without leaving
surviving descendants." In other words, that person will no longer be a beneficiary of any trust
maintained under the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement. Because Michael engaged in
action specifically described in the Forfeiture Provision, he is no longer entitled to benefit from
any trust.
A person who does not have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a controversy to
assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court depends
is not a real party in interest and lacks standing to maintain an action.

For example, in

Blankenship v. Washington Trust Bank, 153 Idaho 292, 281 P.3d 1070 (2012), this Court held
that two beneficiaries of a trust did not have standing to challenge conduct of a trustee that
affected only the separate share of a third beneficiary who was not a party to the action. See
also Christensen, 13 3 Idaho 866, 993 P .2d 1197 ( 1999) (contingent interest of contingent
beneficiaries of a revocable living trust was "mere expectancy," which was not sufficient to

5

The fact that the proceeding to pursue the breach of fiduciary duty claim in the Arizona probate
court is currently stayed by stipulation of the parties has no bearing on the question of whether
Michael' s actions triggered the Forfeiture Provision. The stay does not change the nature of
Michael's actions, and the language of the Forfeiture Provision creates no exception for court
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make them real parties in interest in an action involving the trust).

Because Michael has

disqualified himself from being a beneficiary of any trust established under the Amended and
Restated Trust Agreement, he no longer has a personal stake in the outcome sufficient to
maintain this action.
The will that Sybil signed in 2013 , which exercised the power of appointment that
otherwise would have allowed Michael to benefit from the Survivor's Trust after Sybil's death,
does nothing to change the language of the Forfeiture Provision of the Amended and Restated
Trust Agreement. The condition imposed by the Forfeiture Provision applies to Michael with
equal force, as it would apply to any other beneficiary. To argue otherwise would be to argue
that Michael's rights are somehow greater than those of any other beneficiary.
2.

The Forfeiture Provision should be enforced.

Michael does not dispute that his actions fall within the scope of the specific actions
described in the Forfeiture Provision. Instead, he argues that the Forfeiture Provision should not
be enforced for various reasons.
There is little case law in Idaho dealing with the enforcement of forfeiture clauses, also
known as "in terrorem" provisions, in wills and trusts. Michael concedes that most jurisdictions
have found such provisions valid and generally enforceable. (Appellant's Br. at 28). He also
concedes that under Idaho law the intentions of the grantor should control in determining the
application and interpretation pf provisions in trusts. (Id.) See also Restatement (Third) of
Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers), § 8.5 (2003), comment (b) (The grantor's
proceedings that have been stayed.
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intention-expressed in the penalty provision- should be given effect to the maximum extent
allowed by law); In re Estate of Barfoot, 193 P.3d 920 (Kan.App. 2008) ("A valid no-contest or
similar provision will usually be enforced where it is clear, under the circumstances and facts of
the case and in light of the particular langu_age used, that the testator intended that the conduct in
question should forfeit a beneficiary' s interest under the will." Id. at 925 (quoting 3 A.L.R.5 th , §
2 pp. 611-12)); In re Estate of Koch, 18 Kan.App.2d 188, 849 P.2d 977 (Kan.App. 1993)
(validity and enforceability of an anti-litigation forfeiture clause upheld against sons who failed
to dismiss litigation against their siblings). Nevertheless, Michael argues that an exception to
enforceability should be made in this case.

a.

The Forfeiture Provision is not void as against public policy, and its
enforcement would not interfere with the enforcement or proper
administration of the Survivor's Trust.

First, Michael suggests that the Forfeiture Provision in this case should be held "entirely
unenforceable as a matter of public policy or at least it should be narrowly construed to be
applicable only to claims brought without probable cause" (Appellant' s Br. at 27) because, in
Michael's view, the Forfeiture Provision "unconditionally relieves trustees of their duty to
properly administer a trust and perform their fiduciary duties."

Michael also asserts that

enforcement of the Forfeiture Provision would interfere with the enforcement or proper
administration of the Survivor's Trust. These arguments are misplaced.
Michael explains the ,difference between two types of forfeiture or in terrorem
provisions- so-called "no-contest" clauses and so-called "exculpatory" clauses, and then makes
this sweeping, overly broad statement:
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"Grantors of a trust have no authority to include

provisions within a trust instrument that purport to relieve trustees of their duties to properly
administer a trust or otherwise perform their duties for the benefit of beneficiaries and to the
extent such clauses do so, they are void as against public policy." (Id. at 26.) However, the
authority that the Petitioner cites for this overly broad assertion does not support the argument.
Section 96 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (2012) first sets forth the general principle that
"(a] provision in the terms of a trust that relieves a trustee of liability for breach of trust, and that
was not included in the instrument as a result of the trustee's abuse of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship, is enforceable.;' The Restatement goes on to set forth exceptions to the general rule
of enforceability to the extent that a provision purports to relieve the trustee (1) of a liability for a
breach of trust in bad faith or with indifference to the fiduciary duties of the trustee, the terms or
the purposes of the trust, or the interest of the beneficiaries, or (2) of accountability for profits
derived from a breach of trust. The Restatement also states that "(a] no contest clause shall not
be enforced to the extent that doing so would interfere with the enforcement or proper
administration of the trust."
In determining how these statements from the Restatement might apply to this case, it is
important to note that the trust created by Roger and Sybil was revocable during their combined
lifetimes and that Sybil, the surviving grantor, had the right to withdraw any and all assets from
the Survivor's Trust while she lived and the discretion to appoint any remaining assets to
whomever she wished. The A.µ1ended and Restated Trust Agreement imposed no obligation on
either Roger or Sybil to ensure that any particular asset or any particular value of assets remained
in the Survivor's Trust or went to any particular person at the survivor's death. The Forfeiture
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Provision in this case was designed to serve multiple worthwhile purposes, such as deterring
unwarranted challenges to the grantors' intent by a disappointed descendant seeking to gain
unjustified enrichment at the expense of others and preventing costly litigation that would
deplete the estate or besmirch the reputation of either grantor when the grantor is no longer alive
to provide a defense.

Clause (c) in particular is focused on deterring challenges after the

grantors' deaths to the actions or decisions of either grantor in the form of a creditor's claim
against the grantor's estate.

None of these purposes is against public policy, and none is

designed to exculpate the grantors/trustees from any legitimate duty owed to beneficiaries.
Instead, Michael is trying to use the language of the Restatement to impose a duty on Sybil, as
the surviving grantor, where none otherwise exists.
In arguing that enforcement of the Forfeiture Provision would interfere with proper
administration of the Survivor's Trust, Michael ignores significant provisions of the Amended
and Restated Trust Agreement. Article Eight gives the surviving grantor virtually unlimited
discretion in the use of assets of the Survivor's Trust. Section 18.05 provides:
No successor Trustee is obligated to examine the accounts, records, or actions of
any previous Trustee, the personal representative of the estate of a deceased
Grantor, or any other previous fiduciary . No successor Trustee shall be held
responsible for any act, omission, or forbearance by any previous Trustee or by
the personal representative of the estate of a deceased Grantor or any other
fiduciary.
The Petitioner's position ignores these provisions of the Amended and Restated Trust
\

Agreement. In reality, Michael is the one who seeks to interfere with proper administration of
the Survivor's Trust, by imposing duties that do not otherwise exist. The only interest Michael
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can claim in the Survivor's Trust is the appointed share in the assets of that trust remaining at
Sybil's death. However, Michael has tried to leverage that interest into a right to receive an
accounting of, and reexamine, all actions of his mother as trustee between his father's death and
his mother's death. Clearly, that was not the intent of either grantor.
The provisions of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement that related to the
allocation of trust assets among the various Sub-Trusts upon Roger's death created no right in
any named beneficiary, let alone Michael who was not a named beneficiary, to receive specific
trust assets or a minimum amount of trust assets in the future. Those provisions were designed
primarily to try to minimize taxes. They did not guarantee any amount or any asset to any
beneficiary. And again, the discretionary exercise of the testamentary power of appointment
through her will gave Michael an interest only in a share of whatever assets, if any, remained in
the Survivor's Trust at her death. Even then, Sybil retained the right to change that exercise at
any time before her death.
Taken to its logical conclusion, Michael's arguments would take away the ability of
grantors of revocable living trusts to retain broad discretion over trust assets during their
lifetimes. For example, Michael argues that Sybil, as trustee, was "subject to a strict prohibition
against engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing" (Appellant's Br. at 20),
notwithstanding the provisions of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement that gave Sybil
the right and absolute discretio:p. to use all income and principal of the Survivor's Trust, even to
the exhaustion of all trust assets. In Michael's mind, once Sybil had signed a new will directing
that a portion of the assets of the Survivor's Trust remaining at her death, if any, be distributed to
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him, "Sybil had a continuing duty to properly allocate and manage the [Survivor's] trust with
impartiality as between all of the various beneficiaries," which included Michael, of course.
Just ignore the facts that (1) the trust specifically allowed Sybil to use up all of the assets for any
reason she saw fit and (2) Sybil retained absolute discretion to modify the terms of her will to
change the recipients of the assets of the trust at any time. In the words of the District Court,
such a result "would stand centuries of probate law on its head, bestowing upon children the
legal right to dictate to their parents- who serve as trustees of their own trusts- how much they
can spend to maintain their standard of living and lifestyle in order to assure themselves and
adequate inheritance. Such a result is neither compelled nor even suggested by any known
precedent or statute." (R. p. 921 LL. 2-6).

b.

There is no probable cause for Michael's Arizona petition asserting
breach offiduciary duty claims in Sybil's estate.

Michael's asserts that if this Court does not hold the Forfeiture Provision void as against
public policy, it should nevertheless restrict the enforceability of the provision to claims brought
without probable cause, implying that Michael has probable cause for asserting breach of
fiduciary duty claims against his mother's estate.

In making this assertion, Michael makes

passing reference to Idaho Code § 15-3-905, which prohibits the enforcement of a "no-contest"
provision in a will if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings on the claim and to the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
On its face, Idaho Code § 15-3-905 applies only to wills and not to trusts. There is no
statutory authority or case law in Idaho concerning the question whether an in terrorem provision
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in a trust is enforceable when probable cause existed to bring a challenge that the in terrorem
provision sought to deter. Valid and strong policy reasons exist for not limiting the enforcement
of in terrorem provisions in situations where the state legislature has not enacted any such limit.
See, e.g. , EWG v. First Federal Savings Bank of Sheridan, 413 P .3d 106, 110-11 (Wyo. 2018), in

which the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the claim that an in terrorem clause was
unenforceable as violative of public policy even where a challenge to the testamentary
instrument is made in good faith and with probable cause. This Court need not reach the issue
of whether a probable cause standard should apply to in terrorem clauses in trusts in Idaho
because even if such a standard applies, Michael has not, and cannot, show that probable cause
exists for his assertion of breaches of fiduciary duty against his mother in this case.
Courts seeking to determine whether probable cause exists in this context have uniformly
defined probable cause as "the existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of
evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that
there is a substantial likelihood that the contest or attack will be successful." See In re the
Shaheen Trust, 236 Ariz. 498, 501 , 341 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ariz.App.Div. 2 2015) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers)§ 9.1 cmt. j (1983)). "Subjective belief
that the claims are likely to succeed, while required, is not sufficient; the petitioner's subjective
belief must be objectively reasonable." Id. Under this definition, it appears that the beneficiary
bringing the challenge has th~ burden to show probable cause.

Moreover, where a single

petition alleges multiple challenges, and the challenges are brought in contravention of an in
terrorem provision, probable cause must exist as to each challenge. If any one of the challenges
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is not supported by probable cause, the in terrorem clause should be enforced even if the other
challenges are supported by probable cause. Id. For example, in In re the Shaheen Trust, the
court held that a forfeiture clause should be enforced because one of nine claims in a single
petition was not supported by probable cause. Id at 501-02, 1172-73.
In this case, Michael has admitted that he has no evidence that Sybil breached any
fiduciary duty to him. (R. p. 751 LL. 5-6). ("Michael has no way to determine if the Trust has
been properly administered.") That fact alone is enough to defeat his argument.
In addition, the District Court correctly held that, as a matter of law, Sybil owed no
fiduciary duty to Michael regarding the Survivor's Trust before her death- no duty to account
and no duty to preserve any assets in the trust. Accordingly, no probable cause exists for
Michael to bring a breach of fiduciary duty action against Sybil's Estate.

c.

No principles of equity prohibit enforcement of the Forfeiture Provision in
this case.

Reciting the maxim "He who seeks equity must do equity," Michael argues that the Court
should not enforce the Forfeiture Provision because the Successor Trustees "wrongly obstructed
Michael's right to access Trust financial records" (Appellant's Br. at 40) while attempting to
"coerce" Michael's submission by threatening him with forfeiture. Nothing could be further
from the truth. The Successor Trustees have not failed to do equity in this case in any way.
When Michael asked the Successor Trustees for financial information relating to the Survivor's
Trust, the Successor Trustees provided him an inventory of that trust's assets as of Sybil's death,
an interim accounting from the time that the Successor Trustees became trustees and a large
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amount of underlying financial records, from which the information for the inventory and
accounting were drawn. The Successor Trustees and their counsel met with Michael and his
counsel to answer Michael's questions and offered to answer any other questions Michael might
have concerning financial matters relating to the Survivor's Trust since the Successor Trustees
became the trustees. However, it became apparent that Michael would not be satisfied with
information from the period following Sybil's death. Michael wants the Successor Trustees to
provide him with an accounting of all financial matters related to the Sub-Trusts from the date of
his father's death and with all supporting documentation. Michael refuses to believe the
information that the Successor Trustees already have provided, although he has no evidence
indicating that the information is not accurate. Michael initiated court action to try to pressure
and intimidate the Successor Trustees into complying with his umeasonable demands, despite
the fact that he has no legal or equitable claim related to the trust before Sybil's death. If
anyone has refused to do equity in this case, it is Michael. Michael has engaged in exactly the
ki.l).d of conduct that Roger and Sybil sought to deter when they included the Forfeiture Provision
in the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement. If this Court reverses the District Court ruling
relating to enforcement of the Forfeiture Provision, Michael will continue to engage in such
conduct, to the detriment of all the other trust beneficiaries.

This Court should affirm the

District Court's ruling granting the Successor Trustees' motion for summary judgment to enforce
the Forfeiture Provision and anow the Successor Trustees to move forward with administration
of the trust as Roger and Sybil intended.
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II.

The District Court was correct in holding that Sybil owed no fiduciary duty to
Michael regarding the Survivor's Trust.
Even if this Court were to determine that the Forfeiture Provision could not be enforced

against Michael for some reason, Michael still would not be entitled to compel the Successor
Trustees to provide an accounting of and financial records for the Survivor's Trust for periods
before Sybil's death. All of Michael's arguments to the contrary, including his argument that he
should be allowed to pursue discovery, are built upon the false premise that Sybil owed a
fiduciary duty to him just because she included language in her 2013 will directing that some of
the assets, if any, remaining in the Survivor' s Trust at her death should be distributed to him.

It is clear under Idaho law that even a person named as a contingent beneficiary in a
revocable living trust must have some interest greater than a mere expectancy of receiving trust
assets to have the right to bring an action involving the trust. In Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,
870, 993 P .2d 1197, 1201 (1999), this Court considered a case brought by a trustee of a
revocable living trust and several of her children who were named as contingent beneficiaries in
the trust document to rescind a sale of trust property to another child of the trustee and a family
friend. The Court held that the contingent beneficiaries, who were not assured of receiving
assets from the trust, had no more than a mere expectancy while their parents were still alive,
and, therefore, were not real parties in interest for purposes of bringing an action on behalf of the
trust.
If the contingent beneficiaries who were named in the trust document in Christensen

were not real parties in interest for purposes of maintaining an action involving the assets of the
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trust in that case, Michael certainly is not a real party in interest for purposes of bringing a
breach of fiduciary duty claim challenging the actions of his mother as trustee of any trust
established under the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement before her death. Sybil had the
right under § 8.02 of the agreement to distribute to herself as beneficiary any portion, and as
much as she wanted, of the trust estate of the Survivor's Trust.

Moreover, the power of

appointment that she possessed relative to the property remaining in the Survivor's Trust at her
death was a general power of appointment-the discretionary power to appoint the property
among the members of an indefinite class. She was under no duty to exercise the power of
appointment in favor of Michael or anyone else or to leave any property in the Survivor's Trust
at her death. Even after she signed her will in 2013, she had absolute discretion to change the
provisions in her will relating to the exercise of the power of appointment to the detriment of any
or all persons previously named. Neither Michael nor any other member of the indefinite class
that might benefit from Sybil's exercise of the power of appointment has a right to maintain a
proceeding for breach of fiduciary duty against Sybil. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 46
(2012), comment (b) (" [N]o member of [an indefinite] class can maintain a proceeding to
enforce the intended trust.") and comment (c) (The holder of a discretionary general power of
appointment is under no duty to exercise the power.). Accordingly, the District Court was
correct in concluding that "Michael had no rights in Sybil's estate before her death that he can
now bring suit to enforce," an,d this Court should affirm the District Court's decision in that
regard.
Michael also asserts that the Successor Trustees have an independent fiduciary duty to
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provide him with an accounting of and financial records for the period between Roger's death
and Sybil' s death, when Sybil was acting as sole trustee. He asserts that the fact that the
Successor Trustees have dual roles as beneficiaries of the Family Trust and as trustees of the
Survivor' s Trust created an inherent conflict of interest. (Appellant' s Br. at 5). It should be
noted that all of the potential breaches of fiduciary duty about which Michael expresses concern,
other than the failure of the Successor Trustees to provide him an accounting for and financial
records from the period before Sybil's death, relate to what happened or didn't happen during the
period before Sybil's death-before the Successor Trustee ever served as trustees. During that
period of time, the Successor Trustees had no control over or say in the administration of trust
assets. They did not serve in any dual role at that time. Furthermore, when the Successor
Trustees took over responsibility for trust administration upon Sybil's death, § 18.05 of the
Amended and Restated Trust Agreement expressly relieved them of any duty to prepare or
provide any accounting for Sybil's decisions and actions with respect to any trust for any period
of time during which she was the sole trustee. That section specifically provides: "No successor
Trustee is obligated to examine the accounts, records, or actions of any previous Trustee, the
personal representative of the estate of a deceased Grantor, or any other previous fiduciary. No
successor Trustee shall be held responsible for any act, omission, or forbearance by any previous
Trustee or by the personal representative of the estate of a deceased Grantor or any other
previous fiduciary."
Michael also argues that Idaho Code§ 15-7-303 entitles him to a full accounting of the
Original Trust and all records from the date of Roger's death. Idaho Code§ 15-7-303 relates to
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the duty of a trustee to keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed of the trust and its
administration. Michael particularly emphasizes subsection (b) of§ 15-7-303, which reads:
"Upon reasonable request, the trustee shall provide the beneficiary with a copy of the terms of
the trust which describe or affect his interest and with relevant information about the assets of the
trust and the particulars relating to the administration."
Michael's reliance on§ 15-7-303 to contend that the Successor Trustees have a duty to
provide information about trusts for periods of time before they were trustees and before Michael
had any vested interest in trust assets is misplaced. The language of the statute on its face
relates to information that is "relevant" or that may affect the beneficiary's interest.

Like

Michael's other arguments, this argument also is built upon the false notion that he had some
kind of vested interest in the assets of the Survivor's trust before Sybil's death. He did not.
Accordingly, Sybil's actions and decisions as trustee before her death have no more relevance to,
or affect upon, Michael's putative interest than the amount of money that his parents spent or
saved or loaned or gifted or invested during the many years of their lives. The statute certainly
does not impose a duty on the Successor Trustees to provide Michael with information about
every financial transaction that Roger and Sybil ever entered into.
Even if there were a conflict between the requirements of§ 15-7-303 and the language of
the Amended and Restated Trust document, the specific provisions of the trust document
evidencing the intention of th,e grantors would control.

As noted by the Magistrate, '[t]he

Restatements provide that 'the terms of a trust can dispense with or limit the normal
requirements for submission of reports or accountings . . . or as imposed by statute,' as long as it
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is not prohibited by statute." (R. p. 693 LL. 13-15 quoting Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 83
crnt. d (Arn. Law Inst. 2012). Citing Salfeety v. Seideman (In re Estate of Kirk), 127 Idaho 817,
827, 907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995), the Magistrate went on to say that "Idaho judicial precedent is
clear, however, that the intention of the grantor controls." (R. p. 693 L. 16).
While there is no question that Michael wants to receive an accounting of, and examine
trust financial records relating to, periods before his mother's death, his desire alone does not
make the information necessary or relevant from a legal standpoint.

Michael's arguments

ignore the fact that he had no legal right to any assets from the Survivor's Trust. Sybil had the
right under the terms of the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement to use up any or all of the
assets that were placed in that trust, and she was under no obligation to exercise her discretionary
power of appointment to benefit Michael, even after she signed her new will in 2013. The
starting point for determining what interest, if any, Michael should receive by virtue of Sybil's
exercise of the power of appointment was the balance of assets remaining in the Survivor's Trust
at Sybil's death. Nothing in the statutes or the language of the Amended and Restated Trust
Agreement or Sybil's will changes that fact.
The Successor Trustees have provided Michael with all the relevant information he has
requested concerning the interest that he previously may have had in the assets of the Survivor's
Trust. Michael is not satisfied with that because he believes he is entitled to something that
neither Sybil's will nor the Arn~nded and Restated Trust Agreement grant him.
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III.

The Successor Trustees are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on
appeal.

The Successor Trustees request an award of attorney fees and costs in this appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 . Section 12-121 allows the Court
to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party when the Court finds that the case was
brought, pursued or defended "frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Given this
standard, Michael's request for attorney' s fees is completely unreasonable. The District Court
certainly did not think that the Successor Trustees' position in this case was frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation because the District Court ruled in the Successor Trustees'
favor. Even in the unlikely event that this Court were to reverse the District Court, the fact that
the court below ruled in favor of the Successor Trustees is strong indication that there is a solid
reasonable foundation for the Successor Trustees' position in this matter.
However, the same cannot be said for Michael's position.

As the District Court

observed, the position that Michael and his attorneys have asserted in this matter "would stand
centuries of probate law on its head." Significantly, the District Court noted that no known
precedent or statute supported the result Michael advocates. The District Court also opined that
"it would not be reasonable for Michael or his lawyers to conclude that he would be entitled to
an accounting of the Trust' s financial records before Sybil's death." (R. p. 924 LL. 24-25).
Finally, the District Court observed that Michael' s decision to bring the breach of fiduciary duty
action in the Arizona probate was "not legally sound given the forfeiture language in the Original

RESPONDENTS ' BRIEF - Page 30

Trust." (R. p. 924 L. 30). All of these statements indicate that this appeal is unreasonable and
has been brought without foundation.
When an appellant brings an appeal unreasonably and without foundation, with the only
result being to increase the cost to the parties, an award of attorney fees to the appellees is
appropriate. Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898, 277 P.3d 345 (2012). This appeal has been
brought unreasonably and without foundation. The only result has been to increase the cost to
the parties. This Court should award attorney fees and costs to the Successor Trustees under
Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.
CONCLUSION
All of Michael's arguments in this appeal are based on the false premise that his mother
owed him some kind of fiduciary duty as trustee of the Survivor's Trust during her lifetime.
The language of the trust document does not support that position, and Michael has pointed to no
cases or statutes that lead to that conclusion. Because Sybil owed him no fiduciary duty during
her lifetime, Michael was not justified in bringing a breach of fiduciary duty action against her
estate. The language of the Forfeiture Provision of the trust agreement is specific and clear.
Any beneficiary who files suit on a creditor's claim filed by the beneficiary in a probate of the
estate of either Roger or Sybil, after rejection or lack of action by the applicable fiduciary,
forfeits any benefits that beneficiary otherwise would receive under the trust.

That is what

Roger and Sybil intended, anq that result does not violate the law or public policy. Michael
took action that the Forfeiture Provision sought to deter and triggered the Forfeiture Provision.
This Court should affirm the decision of the District Court.
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Trust." (R. p. 924 L. 30). All of these statements indicate that this appeal is unreasonable and
has been brought without foundation.
When an appellant brings an appeal unreasonably and without foundation, with the only
result being to increase the cost to the parties, an award of attorney fees to the appellees is
appropriate. Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898, 277 P.3d 345 (2012). This appeal has been
brought unreasonably and without foundation. The only result has been to increase the cost to
the parties. This Court should award attorney fees and costs to the Successor Trustees under
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.
CONCLUSION

All of Michael's arguments in this appeal are based on the false premise that his mother
owed him some kind of fiduciary duty as trustee of the Survivor's Trust during her lifetime.
The language of the trust document does not support that position, and Michael has pointed to no
cases or statutes that lead to that conclusion. Because Sybil owed him no fiduciary duty during
her lifetime, Michael was not justified in bringing a breach of fiduciary duty action against her
estate. The language of the Forfeiture Provision of the trust agreement is specific and clear.
Any beneficiary who files suit on a creditor's claim filed by the beneficiary in a probate of the
estate of either Roger or Sybil, after rejection or lack of action by the applicable fiduciary,
forfeits any benefits that beneficiary otherwise would receive under the trust.

That is what

Roger and Sybil intended, anq that result does not violate the law or public policy. Michael
took action that the Forfeiture Provision sought to deter and triggered the Forfeiture Provision.
This Court should affirm the decision of the District Court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27 th day of August, 2019.

Craig Taylor Law Offices, PLLC
Attorney for Respondents/Appellees
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